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THE THREE COMMANDMENTS OF AMENDING 
THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Victor Gold* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence (“the Rules”) 
is considering an amendment to Rule 807, the residual exception to the rule 
against hearsay.  One aspect of the proposed amendment would permit 
admission of hearsay not already covered by an exception in Rules 803 or 
804 so long as the statement is “trustworthy” as established by 
circumstances relating to the statement and corroborating evidence.  This 
would expand the scope of the residual exception in two ways.  First, it 
would eliminate language in the existing Rule that describes the degree of 
trustworthiness required; the Rule currently requires that the proffered 
hearsay have a level of trustworthiness “equivalent” to the exceptions in 
Rules 803 and 804.  Second, the proposed amendment would permit 
trustworthiness to be established, at least in part, by corroborating evidence.  
In contrast, the exceptions in Rules 803 and 804 make admissibility 
dependent on only the circumstances surrounding the hearsay statement in 
question. 
The Rules have been amended many times in the forty years since they 
were enacted.  Unlike the original drafting process, which necessarily 
involved consideration of the Rules as a whole, each round of amendments 
was limited to a specific Rule or set of Rules.1  This particularized focus is 
not myopic, but unavoidable; the Rules are numerous and complex, and the 
time of the Advisory Committee and Congress is limited.  But after more 
than forty years, a broader perspective is possible.  The purpose of this 
Article is to provide a small bit of that perspective, which this Article 
distills into three “commandments” for amending the Rules.2  After a brief 
history of the residual exception and a description of the proposed 
 
*  William H. Hannon Professor of Law and Dean Emeritus, Loyola Law School, Los 
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 1. The only semiexception to this occurred in 2011, when all the Rules were amended 
for style. FED. R. EVID. 101 advisory committee’s note to 2011 amendment.  The 
amendments purported to make no substantive changes. Id. 
 2. Of course, when first enacted, there were Ten Commandments. Exodus 20:1–:17.  
They were reduced in number as part of the general restyling of the Commandments to make 
them more easily understood.  The changes were intended to be stylistic only. See Matthew 
5:17–:22. 
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amendment, this Article considers the extent to which that proposal 
complies with these commandments. 
I.  HISTORY OF THE RESIDUAL EXCEPTION 
Both Rules 803 and 804 contained versions of the residual exception 
when the Rules were enacted in 1975.3  The redundancy and placement 
were purposeful.  Upon creating the residual exception, the Advisory 
Committee made it clear that its intent was not the unfettered exercise of 
judicial discretion.  Instead, the purpose of this innovation was to leave 
some room for admitting hearsay that was “within the spirit of the 
specifically stated exceptions.”4  Thus, the residual exception was made a 
part of both Rules 803 and 804 to show that the traditional exceptions and 
the residual exception were complementary, not at odds.5  To reinforce this 
connection to the traditional exceptions in Rules 803 and 804, the Advisory 
Committee proposed a residual exception that made explicit reference to 
those provisions and required “comparable circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness.”6 
This formulation was insufficient for the House Committee on the 
Judiciary, which deleted the residual exception on the grounds that it 
“inject[ed] too much uncertainty into the law of evidence and impair[ed] the 
ability of practitioners to prepare for trial.”7  The Senate Judiciary 
Committee agreed that an overly broad residual exception was dangerous8 
but disagreed that deletion was appropriate.9  Instead, the Senate Committee 
toughened the language of the exception to connect it even more closely to 
the traditional exceptions in Rules 803 and 804, requiring that hearsay 
admitted under the residual exception have “equivalent [not just 
comparable] circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.”10  The Senate 
Committee intended that “the residual hearsay exceptions [would] be used 
 
 3. See FED. R. EVID. 807 advisory committee’s note. 
 4. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 315 
(1973). 
 5. S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 20 (1974) (“It is intended that the residual hearsay 
exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.  The committee 
does not intend to establish a broad license for trial judges to admit hearsay statements that 
do not fall within one of the other exceptions contained in rules 803 and 804(b).  The 
residual exceptions are not meant to authorize major judicial revisions of the hearsay rule, 
including its present exceptions.”). See generally People v. Katt, 662 N.W.2d 12, 28 (Mich. 
2003) (“Against the nearly four hundred-year-old historical development of our hearsay 
rules, it is clear that the drafters of the rules did not intend a wholesale trampling of the 
enumerated hearsay exceptions when the federal residual hearsay exceptions were 
enacted.”). 
 6. S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 18.  The word “comparable” was used in the 1971 Revised 
Draft of the Rules and the 1972 Supreme Court Draft. See Rules of Evidence for United 
States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. at 303, 322; Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of 
Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315, 437, 439 (1971). 
 7. H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 6 (1973). 
 8. See S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 19. 
 9. Id. at 20. 
 10. Id. at 19. 
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very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.”11  The Senate 
Committee’s version was eventually enacted. 
In 1997, by amendment, the residual exceptions in Rules 803 and 804 
were deleted in favor of a single provision, Rule 807.  The Advisory 
Committee stated that the amendment’s purpose was simply to “facilitate 
additions to Rules 803 and 804.”12  The requirement that hearsay admitted 
under the residual exception have “equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness” was unchanged.13  Thus, while the residual exception was 
no longer a part of Rules 803 and 804, the connection to those provisions, 
as established by the text of Rule 807, remained in place. 
In the more than forty years since the enactment of the Rules, courts have 
been cautious when considering evidence under the residual exception.  But 
it is not accurate to say that the exception has been used “very rarely.”14  
The Advisory Committee’s Reporter collected all reported cases in the past 
ten years in which a court reviewed a claim that hearsay was admissible 
under Rule 807.15  He informed the Advisory Committee that he found 114 
cases in which the court seriously addressed a Rule 807 question and 
excluded the evidence.16  He also found seventy-one cases in which the 
hearsay was found admissible under Rule 807.17  While admitting that this 
data provides an imprecise picture of how the residual exception has been 
applied, the Reporter drew two conclusions:  (1) the residual exception is 
being invoked with surprising frequency and (2) courts are excluding the 
proffered evidence more often than they are admitting it.18 
II.  THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT 
The Advisory Committee has tentatively approved a working draft of an 
amendment to Rule 807.19  The proposal would make several changes to the 
provision, but this Article focuses on only one aspect of those changes.  The 
Rule currently reads, in part: 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. FED. R. EVID. 807 advisory committee’s note to 1997 amendment. 
 13. As amended in 1997, Rule 807 reads, in pertinent part, “[A] hearsay statement is not 
excluded by the rule against hearsay even if the statement is not specifically covered by a 
hearsay exception in Rule 803 or 804:  [if] (1) the statement has equivalent circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness . . . .” FED. R. EVID. 807.  The Advisory Committee’s note to 
the amendment stated, “The contents of Rule 803(24) and Rule 804(b)(5) have been 
combined and transferred to a new Rule 807.  This was done to facilitate additions to Rules 
803 and 804.  No change in meaning is intended.” FED. R. EVID. 807 advisory committee’s 
note to 1997 amendment. 
 14. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 15.  See Memorandum Regarding Expanding the Residual Exception to the Hearsay 
Rule from Daniel J. Capra, Reporter, Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, to Advisory 
Comm. on Evidence Rules (Oct. 1, 2016), in ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF EVIDENCE 
OCTOBER 2016 AGENDA BOOK 109, 125 (2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/ 
2016-10-evidence-agenda-book.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9GH-DHXD]. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 109. 
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(a) In General.  Under the following circumstances, a hearsay statement 
is not excluded by the rule against hearsay even if the statement is not 
specifically covered by a hearsay exception in Rule 803 or 804:  (1) the 
statement has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.20 
The “working draft” of the proposed amendment would revise subsection 
(a)(1) to read: 
(a) In General.  Under the following circumstances, a hearsay statement 
is not excluded by the rule against hearsay even if the statement is not 
specifically covered by a hearsay exception in Rule 803 or 804:  (1) the 
court determines, after considering the pertinent circumstances and any 
corroborating evidence, that the statement is trustworthy.21 
The Reporter offered to the Advisory Committee the following rationale for 
eliminating the reference to “equivalent” circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness: 
The requirement that the court find trustworthiness “equivalent” to the 
circumstantial guarantees in the Rule 803 and 804 exceptions should be 
deleted.  That standard is exceedingly difficult to apply, because there is 
no unitary standard of trustworthiness in the Rule 803 and 804 exceptions.  
It is common ground that statements falling within the Rule 804 
exceptions are not as reliable as those admissible under Rule 803; and it is 
also clear that the bases of reliability differ from exception to exception. 
Moreover, one of the exceptions subject to “equivalence” review—Rule 
804(b)(6) forfeiture—is not based on reliability at all.  Given the difficulty 
of the “equivalence” standard, a better approach is simply to require the 
judge to find that the hearsay offered under Rule 807 is trustworthy.22 
The Reporter also explained the reasons for amending Rule 807 to permit 
corroborating evidence to help establish trustworthiness: 
Trustworthiness can best be defined as a consideration of both 
circumstantial guarantees and corroborating evidence.  Most courts find 
corroborating evidence to be relevant to the reliability enquiry, but some 
do not.  An amendment would be useful to provide uniformity in the 
approach to evaluating trustworthiness under the residual exception—and 
substantively, that amendment should specifically allow the court to 
consider corroborating evidence, as corroboration is a typical source for 
assuring that a statement is reliable.23 
III.  THE THREE COMMANDMENTS 
The Advisory Committee’s proposed changes to Rule 807 are intended to 
expand the application of the residual exception.24  Viewed from the 
perspective of Congress’s original intent and the more than forty-year 
history of amendment to the Rules, the proposal violates three 
“commandments” that should guide the amendment process. 
 
 20. Id. (emphasis added). 
 21. Id. at 8 (emphasis added). 
 22. Id. at 5. 
 23. Id. at 6. 
 24. Id. at 2. 
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A.  Commandment I:  If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It 
The Rules should be amended only when there is a compelling case for 
making the change.  This is because there is almost always a cost to 
amending established evidence rules.  The case should be especially 
compelling when the amendment contradicts the original congressional 
intent. 
There is not a compelling case for changing the “equivalent 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” language of Rule 807.  The 
Reporter notes that this language is illogical because there is significant 
variation in the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness associated with 
the traditional hearsay exceptions in Rules 803 and 804.25  This would be a 
reason for amendment if the logical problem actually impacted how courts 
apply the Rule, as would be the case if courts thought that the Rule required 
that a given item of hearsay have guarantees of trustworthiness “equivalent” 
to all of the traditional exceptions.26  Not surprisingly, the Reporter points 
to no case that applies Rule 807 in this fashion.27  This logical problem is 
avoided if “equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” is 
interpreted to mean that a court should compare the reliability of the 
hearsay in question only to the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness 
demanded by the traditional exception or exceptions that deal with 
analogous evidence or situations.28  This appears to be how courts actually 
apply the residual exception. 
Apart from the logic of the current Rule, the case for an amendment 
might still be compelling if the extent of judicial discretion to admit 
evidence under Rule 807 was unduly constrained by the requirement of 
“equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.”  Of course, 
reasonable minds can disagree over what is a proper level of discretion to 
admit evidence under the residual exception.  But it should be noted that 
some thirty years after the Rule was enacted, the Ninth Circuit stated, “Our 
research has disclosed only one instance where a circuit court reversed a 
 
 25. Id. at 5. 
 26. If there is a logical problem posed by the language in Rule 807 that refers to Rules 
803 and 804, the solution might be to revise the language rather than simply delete the 
reference.  This appears to be what was behind the amendment to the residual exception in 
the Uniform Rules of Evidence.  Uniform Rule 808 now reads, in part, “In exceptional 
circumstances a statement not covered by Rules 803, 804, or 807 but possessing equivalent, 
though not identical, circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by the 
hearsay rule.” UNIF. R. EVID. 808(a). 
 27. See Memorandum Regarding Expanding the Residual Exception to the Hearsay Rule 
from Daniel J. Capra, supra note 15. 
 28. For example, documentary hearsay seems more trustworthy if the document was 
created at a point in time near when the author of the document perceived the facts 
described, as illustrated in Rules 803(5) and 803(6). See FED. R. EVID. 803(5)–(6).  This is 
especially important for written hearsay because there usually is a time gap between the 
moment a person perceives certain facts and the time at which that person sets down those 
facts in writing.  If the gap is too long, the potential for memory to erode is significant. See, 
e.g., Daniel L. Schacter, The Seven Sins of Memory:  Insights from Psychology and 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 182, 184 (1999) (discussing the “transience” 
of memory and the process of gradual forgetting over time). 
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district court to require admission of a statement under FRE 807.”29  Given 
the proclivity of appellate courts to use the harmless error doctrine to avoid 
reversing because of an error under evidence law, it is hard to believe that 
trial courts feel unduly constrained by the current level of discretion to 
admit evidence granted by the residual exception. 
Amending Rule 807 also might be appropriate if problems in applying 
the Rule are now apparent but were unanticipated when the Rule was 
enacted.  As noted above, in assessing ten years of cases applying the 
residual exception, the Reporter found that the residual exception is invoked 
with surprising frequency and that courts are excluding the proffered 
evidence more often than admitting it.30  However, because the residual 
exception is frequently invoked, this frequency can only increase if the 
standard for admissibility is loosened.31  Additionally, if courts are 
excluding evidence offered under the residual exception more often than 
admitting it, then the residual exception is producing precisely the result 
intended by Congress.32 
The proposal to amend Rule 807 might be best explained as an effort to 
address deeper problems presented by hearsay law that the Advisory 
Committee is not yet prepared to address.  The Advisory Committee has 
been concerned with some established hearsay exceptions that are based on 
questionable grounds and the exclusion of reliable hearsay because of an 
unjustifiably negative view of a jury’s ability to weigh such evidence.33  
But a broader review of the Rules regarding hearsay apparently has been 
deferred by the Advisory Committee.34  If larger parts of hearsay law are 
“broke” and need fixing, the Advisory Committee should undertake that 
project.  The assumption that a dose of judicial discretion is acceptable, 
even as just an interim solution, disregards the potential costs of such an 
approach, as described in the following section. 
B.  Commandment II:  First, Do No Harm 
When a patient has a problem, the first rule of the medical profession is 
to proceed with caution.  There are both practical and political reasons to 
take a similarly conservative approach to amending the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. 
 
 29. United States v. Bonds, 608 F.3d 495, 501 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 30. See Memorandum Regarding Expanding the Residual Exception to the Hearsay Rule 
from Daniel J. Capra, supra note 15, at 125. 
 31. This is the intended result of the proposal to amend Rule 807.  See id. at 5 (quoting 
the minutes of the spring 2016 meeting of the Advisory Committee).  Similarly, the draft 
Advisory Committee’s Note states that one of the goals of the proposal is “somewhat greater 
use of the residual exception.” Id. at 9. 
 32. See supra notes 4–11. 
 33. See Memorandum Regarding Expanding the Residual Exception to the Hearsay Rule 
from Daniel J. Capra, Reporter, Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, to Advisory Comm. on 
Evidence Rules 3 (Apr. 1, 2016) [hereinafter Reporter’s April Memorandum] (on file with 
the Fordham Law Review). 
 34. Id. at 2 (describing the fall 2015 symposium on hearsay reform, and the related 
meeting of the Advisory Committee, at which changes to various aspects of the rules 
regarding hearsay, including Rule 807, were discussed). 
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From a practical standpoint, amendments to the Rules create uncertainty.  
Changes in law necessarily undermine the clarifying effect of precedent 
based on the old standard.  Of course, some Rule amendments make the 
language of a Rule more precise and thereby enhance certainty, but 
amendments making admissibility dependent on vague concepts like 
“trustworthiness” are unlikely to have such an effect.  While Rule 807 
already employs this term, the proposed amendment would eliminate the 
one aspect of the current Rule that provides some clarification as to its 
meaning:  requiring a level of trustworthiness “equivalent” to the 
exceptions in Rules 803 and 804.35  Absent any reference to the level of 
required trustworthiness, the degree of uncertainty and the risk of 
inconsistent application increases. 
Certainty is a key value in the law of admissibility.  As House and Senate 
committees emphasized when considering the residual exception,36 the 
ability to predict admissibility is essential to the trial lawyer.  Predictability 
influences how the lawyer will conduct discovery and prepare for trial, 
assess an offer to settle or plea bargain, and decide what witnesses to call 
and arguments to make.  Certainty and predictability also are important for 
the trial judge.  The use of in limine rulings to streamline a trial is 
constrained when standards are vague and require, as the proposed 
amendment would, consideration of corroborating evidence heard during 
trial.37  Precise admissibility rules can be applied quickly and do not disturb 
the flow of a trial.  However, when the Rules turn on broad concepts like 
trustworthiness, the trial judge typically must interrupt the flow of the trial 
to make a record of the reasons for her ruling or even hold a hearing on the 
issue.38 
The amendment to Rule 702 adopted in 2000 is illustrative of the effect 
of vague admissibility standards on courts.  That amendment was passed in 
response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,39 which established that expert scientific evidence 
must be both relevant and reliable.  Mindful that such general standards 
would be of little help to lower courts, the Supreme Court in Daubert went 
on to identify a handful of specific factors that indicate the reliability of 
 
 35. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 36. See supra notes 7–11. 
 37. Cf. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 (1984) (holding that the defendant did not 
preserve for appeal the issue of admissibility of impeachment evidence where he sought an 
in limine ruling and did not testify at trial).  The Court stated: 
A reviewing court is handicapped in any effort to rule on subtle evidentiary 
questions outside a factual context.  This is particularly true under Rule 609(a)(1), 
which directs the court to weigh the probative value of a prior conviction against 
the prejudicial effect to the defendant.  To perform this balancing, the court must 
know the precise nature of the defendant’s testimony, which is unknowable when, 
as here, the defendant does not testify. 
Id. 
 38. S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 20 (1974) (“The special facts and circumstances which, in 
the court’s judgment, indicate[] that the statement has a sufficiently high degree of 
trustworthiness . . . should be stated on the record.”). 
 39. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
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scientific evidence.40  The amendment to Rule 702 describes only the 
general standard, requiring that expert testimony be based on “reliable 
principles and methods . . . reliably applied . . . to the facts of the case.”41  
More a general principle than a rule, “reliability” gives courts little 
guidance.  Accordingly, when lower courts are confronted with expert 
testimony in disciplines outside of science, they follow Daubert but 
struggle to identify concrete factors indicative of reliability in the specific 
area of expertise at issue.42  An enormous number of reported cases have 
undertaken this burden.43  While this factor analysis dominates the cases, 
the broad language of the amended Rule is mentioned, if at all, only in 
passing.  Given the complexity of the issues that courts must resolve in 
determining reliability, a “Daubert hearing,” at which all the pertinent 
factors are weighed by the court on the record, is now a common 
procedure.44  By removing the only aspect of the current Rule that attempts 
to guide courts in determining the factors pertinent to trustworthiness, the 
proposed amendment to Rule 807 points the law of hearsay down a similar 
road. 
A conservative approach to amending the Rules is rooted in more than 
just practical concern for how amendments affect lawyers and judges.  Such 
an approach shows an understanding of the differences between initial 
enactment and subsequent amendment.  No work on an amendment can 
ever match the attention given by the Advisory Committee, the Supreme 
Court, and Congress when the Rules were initially proposed.  A good 
example is the controversy over the residual exception, which generated 
conflicting House and Senate approaches and finally a compromise over 
language.45  Moreover, only in the initial rulemaking process were the 
Rules considered in their entirety.  This made possible a balancing and 
political compromise with a broad perspective.  Subsequent amendments to 
individual Rules are likely to be blind to the trade-offs that only are visible 
through a holistic perspective.46  Subsequent amendments are also often 
made without a full understanding of the impact those amendments will 
have on other Rules.47  The Rules are a system, not a collection of unrelated 
 
 40. Id. at 593–94. 
 41. FED. R. EVID. 702(c)–(d).  The Advisory Committee’s Note to the 2000 amendment 
to Rule 702 observed, “No attempt has been made to ‘codify’ these specific factors.” FED. R. 
EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment. 
 42. See 29 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 
§§ 6269.1–.10 (2d ed. 2016). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. § 6270. 
 45. See supra notes 7–11. 
 46. For a description of the extent to which Congress debated and revised the proposed 
Federal Rules of Evidence as a whole, see 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. 
GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5006 (2d ed. 2005). 
 47. An ironic example is the addition in 1997 of Rule 804(b)(6), currently entitled 
“Statement Offered Against a Party That Wrongfully Caused the Declarant’s 
Unavailability.”  The Reporter to the Advisory Committee cites this exception, which does 
not depend on reliability as a basis for admitting hearsay, as an example of the lack of logic 
behind Rule 807’s “equivalent” trustworthiness requirement.  Memorandum Regarding 
Expanding the Residual Exception to the Hearsay Rule from Daniel J. Capra, supra note 15, 
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laws;48 changes in one Rule tend to produce unintended consequences in 
others. 
This is not to say that amendments lack legitimacy or are always a bad 
idea.  The world changes, we learn from experience, and the Rules should 
adapt.  However, unless something significant changes, or unless 
experience proves that the judgments of the original rulemakers were 
wrong, the Advisory Committee should proceed with a healthy dose of 
caution. 
C.  Commandment III:  Be Careful What You Wish For 
The proposal to expand the scope of the residual exception is likely to 
produce a series of what may be unintended consequences.  If the residual 
exception in its current form is used with surprising frequency,49 we should 
expect that loosening the standards of that exception will make its 
invocation much more widespread.  Eliminating the “equivalent” 
trustworthiness requirement implies that a lower level of trustworthiness is 
sufficient for the residual exception.  Additionally, the proposed 
amendment would make it easier to establish trustworthiness, permitting the 
court to consider both the circumstances surrounding the hearsay statement 
and corroborating evidence.  The exceptions in Rules 803 and 804 permit 
consideration of only the former.50 
For the same reasons, the proposed amendment should trigger a 
significant expansion in the use of the “near miss doctrine,”51 under which 
 
at 114.  There is no indication that when Rule 804 was amended to add the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing to this exception, the drafters had any inkling that this would have implications 
for Rule 807. 
 48. For example, consider the manner in which Rule 602 (the personal knowledge 
requirement) and Rule 802 (the hearsay rule) work together. 27 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & 
VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 6023 (2007). 
 49. Memorandum Regarding Expanding the Residual Exception to the Hearsay Rule 
from Daniel J. Capra, supra note 15, at 125. 
 50. The proposed amendment to Rule 807 raises a number of difficult issues by 
suggesting that the trustworthiness and admissibility of a given item of hearsay can be 
established, at least in part, by corroborating evidence.  These issues include the following:  
Does the corroborating evidence itself have to be admissible?  Can two items of otherwise 
inadmissible hearsay corroborate each other and, thus, bootstrap each into admissibility?  
The proposed amendment to Rule 807 would retain the aspect of the current version of Rule 
807 that requires hearsay be more probative on the point for which it is offered than other 
evidence. See Memorandum Regarding Expanding the Residual Exception to the Hearsay 
Rule from Daniel J. Capra, supra note 15, at 113.  But if corroborating evidence can 
establish admissibility of the hearsay, does that not mean that the probative value of the 
hearsay is diminished? See JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 672–73 (5th ed. 
1999) (noting that a need for evidence is a factor in assessing probative value under Rule 
403).  In that case, corroborating evidence is a mitigating factor in favor of admissibility 
under one part of the proposed Rule 807, while mitigating against admissibility under 
another part of that provision.  How should a court resolve this conflict in exercising its 
discretion? 
 51. Under the “near miss” doctrine, Rule 807 can be used to admit hearsay that is 
covered by the exceptions in Rules 803 or 804 but fails to meet all the requirements of that 
exception.  For example, a business record that meets most but not all of the requirements of 
Rule 803(6) might be admitted under Rule 807 on the theory that, so long as the 
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the residual exception can be employed to make admissible an item of 
hearsay that satisfies some but not all of the requirements of an exception in 
Rules 803 or 804.52  In fact, the Reporter suggests this is an intended 
consequence of the proposed amendment to Rule 807.53  While one can 
argue about the merits of the near miss doctrine, an amendment to Rule 807 
should not pursue such an objective without acknowledging that it 
undermines congressional intent:  Congress said that it connected the 
residual exception to the trustworthiness standards of Rules 803 and 804 for 
the purpose of preventing the emasculation of the traditional exceptions 
codified in those provisions.54 
Moreover, we should not imagine that this expansion of the residual 
exception would be outcome neutral.  If hearsay were a retail product, 
government and businesses would be Walmart, every day generating 
unfathomable numbers of documents concerning every aspect of their 
affairs.  The government and businesses can be expected to take full 
advantage of the opportunity to use an expanded residual exception as a 
way to avoid the more limiting constraints of the business and public 
records exceptions to the hearsay rule.  Individual litigants are less likely to 
plan for and enjoy the benefit of an expansive residual exception. 
While expanded use of the proposed amendment to the residual exception 
may often make the exceptions in Rules 803 and 804 superfluous, the 
greatest impact would be on the rule against hearsay itself, Rule 802.  The 
 
requirements of the latter seem to have been met, the fact that the evidence fails to satisfy the 
specific exception for business records does not mean the evidence should be excluded. See, 
e.g., United States v. Banks, 514 F.3d 769, 778 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that where hearsay 
failed to satisfy the business records exception in Rule 803(6) because the party offering 
hearsay failed to call a foundation witness to qualify the records, Rule 807 could be used to 
admit the evidence on the ground that it was otherwise reliable).  While a number of courts 
have adopted this approach, other courts have held that a near miss is simply a miss, and thus 
evidence that is of a type addressed by a specific hearsay exception like Rule 803(6), but 
which fails to satisfy all the requirements of that exception, cannot be admitted under Rule 
807. See, e.g., Bryndle v. Boulevard Towers, II, LLC, 132 F. Supp. 3d 486, 497 (W.D.N.Y. 
2015) (holding that where hearsay failed to satisfy the business records exception in Rule 
803(6) because the party offering hearsay failed to call a foundation witness to qualify the 
records, Rule 807 could not be used to admit the evidence on the ground that it was 
otherwise reliable).  For a discussion of the near miss debate, see Elizabeth DeCoux, Textual 
Limits on the Residual Exception to the Hearsay Rule:  The “Near Miss” Debate and 
Beyond, 35 S.U. L. REV. 99 (2007). 
 52. The Reporter notes that a majority of courts permit the residual exception to admit 
hearsay that falls under a category covered by a specific exception in Rules 803 or 804 but 
fails to meet all the requirements of that exception. Reporter’s April Memorandum, supra 
note 33, at 8. 
 53. Id. at 3. 
 54. S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 18–19 (1974).  The Reporter suggests that the proposed 
amendment would not permit Rule 807 to “swallow the categorical exceptions,” because the 
amendment would retain the requirement that the hearsay in question be more probative on 
the point for which it is offered than other evidence. Memorandum Regarding Expanding the 
Residual Exception to the Hearsay Rule from Daniel J. Capra, supra note 15, at 111–12.  
The logic behind this assertion is unclear.  Retention of the “more probative” requirement 
has to do with whether there is other evidence on point, not whether the hearsay in question 
is admitted under Rule 807 even though it is not made admissible by the categorical 
exceptions of Rules 803 and 804. 
2017] THREE COMMANDMENTS OF AMENDING THE RULES 1625 
proposed expansion of the residual exception would make Rule 802 the 
only general rule of exclusion subject to a broad judicial power to admit 
evidence on the ground that the reason for applying the exclusion seems 
weak.55  There is no general exception to privileges where the court thinks 
that, under the circumstances, the policies underlying the privileges are 
weak.  The limits on character evidence are not subject to a general 
exception creating discretion to admit evidence if the judge thinks the jury 
is unlikely to be improperly prejudiced.  Similarly, the “best evidence 
rule”56 does not contain a general exception allowing all secondary 
evidence to be admitted so long as the judge thinks that evidence is a 
“trustworthy” rendition of the contents of the original writing.  Of course, 
Rule 403 gives courts discretion to exclude otherwise admissible evidence 
in an appropriate case.  However, no Rule establishes discretion to admit 
evidence that is otherwise inadmissible.  This is because such a Rule runs 
counter to the very notion of codifying rules of admissibility.  The Senate 
Judiciary Committee made this very point when considering the residual 
exception:  “an overly broad residual hearsay exception could . . . vitiate the 
rationale behind codification of the rules.”57 
CONCLUSION 
Evidence law attempts to balance the benefits of specific admissibility 
standards against the need for discretion.  These are complementary values, 
as when there are no standards the law is arbitrary, but without discretion 
the law is mindless.  The trick is to avoid striking the balance too far in one 
direction or the other.  One way to tell whether the balance is proper is to 
ask whether there are factors to guide discretion.  Since Rule 807’s 
inception, discretion to decide trustworthiness under the Rule has been 
anchored to the exceptions in Rules 803 and 804.  Sever that anchor, and 
the residual exception is adrift. 
 
 55. The principal reason for excluding hearsay is, when a statement is given out of court, 
reliability cannot be tested through cross-examination before the trier of fact. See 30 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 
§ 6325 (1997). 
 56. See FED. R. EVID. 1002. 
 57. S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 19. 
